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One effective way of detecting malicious traffic in computer networks is intrusion detection systems 
(IDS). Despite the increased accuracy of IDSs, distributed or coordinated attacks can still go undetected 
because of the single vantage point of the IDSs. Due to this reason, there is a need for attack characteristics' 
exchange among different IDS nodes.  Another reason for IDS coordination is that a zero-day attack (an 
attack without a known signature) experienced in organizations located in different regions is not the same.  
Collaborative efforts of the participating IDS nodes can stop more attack threats if IDS nodes exchange 
these attack characteristics among each other. Researchers proposed a cooperative intrusion detection 
system  (CoIDS) to share these attack characteristics effectively. Although this solution enhanced IDS 
node’s ability to respond to attacks previously identified by cooperating IDSs, malicious activities such as 
fake data injection, data manipulation or deletion, data integrity, and consistency are problems threatening 
this approach.  
In this dissertation, we develop a blockchain-based solution that ensures the integrity and consistency of 
attack characteristics shared in a cooperative intrusion detection system. The developed architecture 
achieves this result by continuously monitoring blockchain nodes' behavior to detect and prevent 
malicious activities from both outsider and insider threats. Apart from this, the architecture facilitates 
scalable attack characteristics’ exchange among IDS nodes and ensures heterogeneous IDS  participation. 
It is also robust to public IDS nodes joining and leaving the network. The security analysis result shows 
that the architecture can detect and prevent malicious activities from both outsider and insider attackers, 







The development of information technologies and the trend of integrating cyber, physical, and social 
(CPS) systems into a highly unified information society are becoming increasingly apparent, especially 
with the recent proliferation of smart devices and the Internet of Things (IoT) [1]. Such an information 
society generates and shares a massive amount of data anytime, and the data’s security should be under 
the control of its owner [2-3]. An increasing amount of personal data, including location information, web-
searching behavior, user calls, and user preference, is silently collected by the built-in sensors inside the 
products from those big companies, bringing colossal privacy leakage risk for the data owners [4-5]. Given 
the tremendous increase in information technology data, companies have searched for more secure ways 
of exchanging data among users. Companies store data in their on-premises data centers to manage data 
security; however, it is challenging to manage this data locally, especially now that they deal with exabyte 
scale data. To exchange data, data owners often rely on internet providers for the security of in-transit 
data. The reliance on internet providers makes such data exposed to third-party and confined the data 
transfer to the provider’s communication channel, which in most cases has security vulnerabilities, thus, 
making data security out of the control of their owners. The inability to effectively manage in-transit data 
security makes it very challenging for an individual to control the collected data's risks [6]. 
The increasing popularity of the internet has made data owners turn to cloud solutions for secured data 
storage and exchange. Thus, cloud storage is gaining popularity not only among enterprises but also among 
small organizations and individuals. For example, OpenStack [7], an open-source cloud computing 
platform, is becoming the de-facto standard for Infrastructure-as-a-Service clouds, as it is backed by 
technology giants like IBM, Dell, Cisco, which sell and support OpenStack-based solutions. Also, 
Amazon Web Service (AWS), Google, and Microsoft Azure are becoming forces to reckon with because 
of the security, durability,  availability, and scalability of data. Consequently, companies rely on cloud 
storage for their data because it is more secure and easily accessible; however, the caveat is that the 
internet-based stored data’s attack surface has increased tremendously. Several kinds of research put 
forward ways of securing both data at rest (stored data) and data in transit. For instance, the authors in [8] 
proposed firewall, user authentication, and data encryption to control data access in a computer network. 
Although a network built around user authentication, firewall, and data encryption systems has been able 
to secure companies and individuals from cyber-attacks, malicious intruders continuously find ways to 
subvert these protection systems to attack networks and gain unauthorized access to stored data. 
Further research described intrusion detection systems (IDS) as an additional wall to identify malicious 
intruders in computer networks and devices connected to the Internet [9-11]. Intrusion detection can 
provide two main functions: a) Information Recording: An IDS can monitor the target objects and record 
information locally, then sends the collected data to other facilities for analysis, like central event 
management. b) Alert Generation: The main task of an IDS is to generate alerts to inform security 
administrators of significant identified anomalies. False alarm rates are an essential measurement to decide 
whether an IDS is effective or not [12].  An IDS can generally be classified based on their locations:  Host-
based intrusion detection system (HIDS) and network-based intrusion detection system (NIDS) [11] or 
their detection approaches: signature-based and anomaly-based [10] (Figure 1).  
 
Fig 1. Classification of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) 
A HIDS analyzes the traffic to and from a specific host in which the intrusion detection software resides. 
It is a system that is installed on the individual host to detect an intrusion or misuse and responds by 
logging the activity and notifying the designated authority[11]. A host-based system can monitor essential 
system files, process behaviors, unusual resource utilization, unauthorized access,  any attempt to 
overwrite files, and so on. On the other hand, a NIDS is often a stand-alone hardware appliance that 
includes network detection capabilities. The NIDS, located anywhere within the network, monitors 
network traffic and detects any malicious activities by identifying a suspicious pattern in the incoming 
packets[11]. It captures network packets from the network traffic. The captured packet's header is analyzed 
based on the various parameters (known as features) to detect malicious activities. It can be set up in the 
network backbone, server, switches, and gateways. HIDS and NIDS can either be signature-based or 
anomaly-based IDS. 
A Signature-based IDS detects intrusion by comparing an incoming traffic with a set of predefined rules. 
The technique looks for a specific behavior pattern, which is already known as an attack [13]. All the 
negative patterns and behaviors which are identified as attacks are stored in the IDS signature database. 
This signature database is continuously updated and used for attack detection. This technique's limitation 
is that it cannot detect a zero-day attack (attacks for which there are no signatures), as a signature is not 
yet available[13]. The trade-off is that a signature-based IDS can achieve 100% accuracy if the attack rules 
are correctly set. In contrast, an anomaly-based IDS detects incoming traffic patterns that do not conform 
to the expected regular traffic pattern. In anomaly-based IDS, network traffic or host OS behavior is 
analyzed based on various parameters and compared to an expected behavior [10]. If incoming traffic 
patterns do not conform to the expected regular traffic, the system raises alarms. Although the anomaly-
based IDS can detect new zero-day attacks, unlike the signature-based IDS, its accuracy level is usually 
below that of the signature-based IDS[11]. Signature-based and anomaly-based IDSs can be located in a 
host as in HIDS or the network as in NIDS. 
Intrusion Detection Systems proved to help identify malicious activities in computer networks and  IoT 
devices; however, its single vantage point limits its capability in detecting coordinated or distributive 
attacks. Consequently, some attacks can go undetected or not detected on time. As a result of attack escape, 
IDS nodes need to exchange attack information to detect new or recurring attacks promptly. Another 
reason for attack information sharing is that a zero-day attack experienced by organizations located in 
different regions is not the same. For instance, a zero-day attack experienced by an organization located, 
say in London, the United Kingdom, might not be the same as that experienced by another organization 
located, say in New York, the United States, or another company located in the same region. Therefore, if 
IDS nodes can exchange this threat information, more malicious activities can be stopped by coordinating 
efforts of the participating IDSs.  
1.1 Cooperative Intrusion Detection System (CoIDS) 
A cooperative intrusion detection system (CoIDS) was proposed to enhance the detection coverage of 
single IDS [14-16]. In the CoIDS, IDS nodes exchange attack signatures with neighboring IDS nodes with 
the view of promptly detecting an attack that other IDS nodes have previously detected. CoIDS is a 
framework that collects attack signatures from IDS nodes and disseminates this information to other 
neighboring IDS. Often, CoIDS engages a centralized process, such as a cloud database, in data 
dissemination[15].  Companies adopted cooperative intrusion detection system because of the better 
performance; however, some of the major problems threatening the approach are: 
• Data manipulation: Malicious intruders can hack the database and alter the data that is being 
exchanged even if it is encrypted.   
• Data deletion: Stored data can be deleted from the database by a malicious insider or outsider 
if the activities are not monitored. 
• Fake data injection to the database: When data manipulation is not readily achievable, a 
malicious intruder can inject fake data into the database if hacked, thereby compromising the 
shared data integrity. 
• It might be challenging to guarantee the shared data's consistency due to a compromised 
medium of exchange. 
• A centralized platform utilized by CoIDS can make the network susceptible to single-point-
of-failure attacks. 
• There is a need to trust a third party that manages the database's activities, making the network 
vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. 
1.2 Statement of the problem  
As reported in [17], achieving attack information distribution in the existing CoIDS solution is divided mainly 
into four stages (Figure 2), and cyber attackers attempt to compromise the shared information by targeting the 
storage and distribution stage.  
 
Fig. 2.  Cyber-attack targets of existing CoIDS 
 
Diverse research put forward methods to secure both stored and in-transit data [14,15, 18-20]. However, 
most of these existing researches focus on utilizing a centralized approach (which makes the network 
vulnerable to single-point-of-failure and man-in-the-middle attacks [14,15,18]) or uses a decentralized 
approach in which the integrity and consistency of the shared data cannot be guaranteed [19-20]. Data 
users believe that stored or in-transit data is secured as long as it is encrypted. Although encryption ensures 
such data's confidentiality, it is not tamperproof as it does not guarantee such data's consistency and 
integrity. Several research pieces proposed ways of securing data integrity [21]. However, most of the 
methods are not practical, especially for big data. For instance, authors in [21] proposed a message 
authentication code (MAC) to secure data integrity. In this method, a data file is downloaded, and the hash 
value is checked. This method detects accidental and intentional changes in the data; however, 
downloading and calculating large files' MAC is overwhelming and time-consuming. Another method 
proposed in [21] secures cloud data integrity by computing the hash values of every data in the cloud using 
a hash tree. This solution is lighter than the first method. However, it is also not practical because 
computing the hash values of massive data requires more computational power, and it is time-consuming. 
The authors in [22] utilize a third party to coordinate the database's activities. In this method, a person 
with skills and experience carries all auditing processes, such as checking data integrity. The approach's 
problem is the need to trust the third party, which exposes data to a man-in-the-middle attack or the 
network to a single-point-of-failure attack. 
In this work, we propose a solution that leverages blockchain technology abilities to store, detect and 
prevent malicious activities on data (e.g., cyberattack features and signatures, Patient health records) and 
distribute them to nodes in different regions in real-time. The approach extracts cyberattack features or 
signatures from an IDS node, invokes server-side authentication for transaction owners, verifies the data’s 
consistency and integrity, presents it in a standard format, and stores it into an immutable decentralized 
database. The solution securely distributes the attack features or signature among participating IDS nodes 
that subscribe to the blockchain network in real-time to achieve cooperative intrusion detection systems 
(Figure 3). We define attack features as characteristics of attacks retrieve from attack traffic detected by an 
IDS. On the other hand, attack signatures are predefined rules that detect a specific attack, and it is obtained 
from signature-based IDS. We also define a transaction as any information (e.g., an attack signature or 
features) that a node submits to the blockchain network. 
 
Fig. 3.  The proposed blockchain-based solution for CoIDS. 
 
1.3  Contributions of the work 
The contributions of the work can be  summarized as follows: 
• We propose a private-public blockchain-based architecture that facilitates scalable and secured 
attack signature exchange among  IDS nodes in computer networks. The architecture retrieves 
attack signature from any signature-based IDS, e.g., SNORT[23], then securely distribute it among 
other participating signature-based IDS nodes, e.g., Bro[65], Suricata[66], in a computer network 
for cooperative intrusion detection systems. 
• We propose a blockchain-based architecture that can facilitate a scalable and secured exchange of 
attack features among IDS nodes. The architecture retrieves attack features from any anomaly-
based IDS (e.g., Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA)[9]) using a developed script, then securely 
distribute it among other participating IDS. 
• The developed architecture detects and prevents malicious activities on either stored or in-transit 
data from outsider threat actors. The architecture detects and prevents a public node from 
compromising the stored attack information by leveraging the server-side authentication code 
executed by the smart contract.  
• The proposed architecture monitors the activities of blockchain nodes to detect compromised 
insider nodes. The architecture identifies and thwarts the malicious activities of compromised 
authorized blockchain nodes by continuously examining the individual node’s behavior. We 
evaluate the detection ability of the proposed architecture based on attacks that fall under three 
categories: (a)Those attacks targeting the Blockchain to bring it down (b) the attacks that attempt 
to inject fake data into the database (c) The attacks that attempt to hijack or retrieve unauthorized 
data. 
• The proposed architecture provides strong server-side authentication and verification procedures 
for the transaction owner and submitted transactions. The authentication and verification 
procedures ensure that only non-malicious authorized nodes can submit a transaction and verify 
the submitted features or signatures' integrity and consistency.  The architecture converts a 
successfully verified transaction into a standard format that different IDSs can easily understand; 
thus, the architecture encourages heterogeneous IDS node participation. The smart contract 
invokes a code that converts attack signatures to standard format based on the mandatory variables. 
We defined a format for the features and ensured that the verification code compares an incoming 
transaction with the format before converting it to a standard or generalized format.   
• The architecture permanently stores the verified transaction in a tamper-proof, immutable, 
distributive blockchain network. Contrary to the centralized or other distributed storage system 
that is vulnerable to malicious activities, transactions in a blockchain network are permanently 
stored, and it is impossible to manipulate or delete. Access to the stored transaction is shared among 
the authorized participating IDS nodes in real-time.   
• The proposed architecture is robust to public IDS nodes joining and leaving the network in real-
time. The architecture grants permissionless access to public IDS nodes to join the blockchain 
network and retrieve stored attack features or signatures in real-time without posing any security 
concern. The architecture can also restrict transaction retrieval access to specific nodes if the 
information is not meant for every node.  
• We also proposed an application of the developed architecture in the healthcare system. Using the 
same concept, we described how the architecture could securely share Electronic Health Records 
(EHRs) between two or more Healthcare Systems. We further described how we implement the 



















2.1  Description of Blockchain 
Blockchain technology has recently received significant interest from various international organizations, 
industries, and institutions and has even been expressed by some researchers as a more robust technology 
than the Internet [24]. Before the popularity of blockchain applications, there was a need to trust a third 
party for digital assets' security and privacy. With the invention of blockchain, people no longer need a 
third-party agent to provide security and verification in their product or service transfer operations. The 
“trust protocol” created by blockchain provides a reliable, transparent, and accountable environment [25]. 
First introduced as the technology behind bitcoin in 2008 [26], blockchain was implemented to solve the 
double-spending problem in a cryptocurrency called bitcoin. Blockchain technology is a new type of 
database that non-trust parties can directly share without requiring a central administration, unlike SQL or 
other databases. It is a distributed, decentralized, transparent, chronological, and append-only public 
ledger that records all network transactions. Every participant in the blockchain network is called a node. 
The data in the blockchain is known as a transaction, and it is divided into blocks. Each block is dependent 
on the previous one (parent block). Every block stores some metadata and hash value of previous blocks; 
hence, every block has a parent block[26].  
The network's algorithm ensures that each transaction is unique. Each block of transactions in the public 
ledger is verified by consensus (an agreement among participating nodes) of most of the system's 
participants. The consensus is achieved by a proof-of-work protocol in a mining process. A proof-of-work 
protocol is a mathematical algorithm that is difficult to produce, but it is easy to verify. Once the 
transaction is verified, it is impossible to mutate/erase the records  (i.e., none of the users, even the 
administrators, can change or delete the existing chain of blocks) [26]. To determine with high probability 
that a transaction is permanently included in the blockchain, one must wait for several blocks to be mined 
after the first inclusion and refer to the block, including the transaction of interest as an ancestor. Each of 
these subsequent blocks is called confirmations, and when sufficient confirmations occurred after the 
transaction block inclusion, then the transaction is considered committed, i.e., believed to remain in the 
blockchain forever with high probability. For instance, the current version of Ethereum requires 11 blocks 
after the transaction inclusion for the transaction to be committed [27].   
Blockchain is revolutionizing the digital world by enabling a distributed consensus where every online 
transaction, past and present, involving digital assets can be verified at any time in the future. It does this 
without compromising the privacy of the digital assets and parties involved. The distributed consensus 
and anonymity are two essential characteristics of blockchain technology[26]. Blockchain is broadly 
divided into two: public and private blockchain [12]. A public blockchain, also known as a permissionless 
blockchain, is where anybody can join the network to be a verifier without obtaining any prior permission 
to perform such network tasks. There is no centralized authority, or no party has more power than the rest. 
Here, everyone is opened to join or leave as they wish. The blockchain is publicly opened, and everyone 
has the right to validate a transaction. Since anybody can join, specific types of incentive mechanisms are 
necessary for verifiers to participate. For instance, the bitcoin blockchain's validators get bitcoins (BTC) 
in transaction fees, and the new bitcoins are generated for the effort they put into solving the proof-of-
work challenge. Blockchain has the advantage that it can accommodate both anonymous and pseudo-
anonymous actors. Bitcoin and Ethereum are examples of permissionless blockchains[28].  
On the other hand, private blockchains are permissioned blockchains where special permission is needed 
from an authority to become a verifier in the system. Permissioned blockchains are intended to be purpose-
built and can thus be created to maintain compatibility with existing applications (financial or otherwise). 
A Permissioned blockchain is known to be faster, more energy-efficient, and scalable than a 
permissionless blockchain. It can be easily implementable than a permissionless blockchain. In a 
permissionless blockchain, the data is stored on every blockchain node, and all nodes verify all 
transactions. In a permissioned blockchain, not everyone has equal rights to validate transactions. Thus, 
only a few nodes are given certain privileges of validating the transactions. The rest may validate, but 
these selected participants must reach a consensus before the implementation. However, it is much easier 
for users to collaborate and alter the rules or revert transactions because of the smaller number of 
participants; hence, 51% attack threatens private blockchain [28]. That is why only trusted parties should 
be permitted to act as verifiers. Examples of permissioned blockchains include Eris, Hyperledger, and 
Ripple.  
2.2 Basic Terminologies in Blockchain Technology 
Hash Function: This a function that converts letters and numbers input of any length into an encrypted 
output of a fixed length. In a blockchain, hashing requires processing the data from a block through a 
mathematical function, resulting in an output of a fixed length. Using a fixed-length output increases 
security since anyone trying to decipher the hash will not be able to tell the length of the input by merely 
looking at the length of the output. The function used to generate the hash is deterministic, meaning that 
it will produce the same result each time the same input is used [71]. 
Nonce: A nonce is an abbreviation for " number only in used once.” It is a string of numbers added to a 
hashed or encrypted block in a blockchain, that when rehashed, meets the difficulty level of restriction. 
The nonce is the number a blockchain miner needs to discover before successfully solving a block in the 
blockchain. To determine the correct nonce requires a significant amount of trial-and-error, as it is a 
random number. A miner must guess a nonce, append it to the current header, rehash the value, and 
compare this to the target hash. If the hash meets the target restriction, the miner has successfully validated 
the block [72]. 
Target Hash: A target hash is a number that a hashed block header must be less than or equal to for a new 
block to be awarded. The target hash is used in determining the difficulty in a blockchain and can be 
adjusted to ensure that blocks are processed efficiently. The difficulty or target hash is calculated based 
on the timestamp on the previous block header. Each miner calculates the difficulty of the same block 
independently since everyone uses the same algorithm. Thus, everyone gets the same results. The 
timestamp of the target hash is adjusted based on the previous block's timestamp [73].   
Merkle Tree:  A Merkle tree involves taking a large amount of data and making it more manageable to 
process.  In a most general sense, a Merkle tree is a way of hashing a large number of "chunks" of data 
together, which relies on splitting the chunks into buckets, where each bucket contains only a few 
chunks[29]. It is implemented by taking each bucket's hash and repeating the same process, continuing to 
do so until the total number of hashes becomes only one, the root hash, and place it in the block header. It 
represents the summary of all transaction data. The Merkle tree is helpful because it allows users to verify 
a specific transaction without downloading the whole blockchain. With Merkle trees, it is possible to build 
blockchain nodes that run on all computers and laptops, large and small smartphones, and even the Internet 
of things devices [29]. 
Mining: Mining adds blocks of transactions to the massive distributed public ledger of actual transactions, 
known as the blockchain. Mining involves validating new transactions and recording on the distributive 
ledger. To validate a transaction, the miners verify that the transaction is legal (neither malicious nor 
double-spend) [75].  
Consensus Protocol: Consensus involves agreeing on the ordering of the validated transactions. Each 
time a transaction is made, it is broadcasted to the entire network. Upon hearing the broadcasts, miners 
take a bunch of transactions, validate that they are legitimate,  and put them into a block. However, miners 
hear about different transactions at different times (due to latency issues). Furthermore, they may simply 
choose different transactions to include in their block base on transaction fees. So essentially, each miner 
is building his block, and this block may be completely different from the rest of the miners in the network. 
Miners do not need to build the same global block; thus, they can build their block consisting of entirely 
different transactions. Moreover, the participants will come to a consensus on which block is included 
next. Only one block can be added at a time, and the miners need to agree upon which one, hence, the 
introduction of consensus protocols [76]. There are different types of consensus protocols; some of them 
are explained below 
Proof-of-Work (PoW): Proof-of-Work is essentially a puzzle that consists of a challenge to which proof 
must be found. This concept has existed before Bitcoin and virtual cryptocurrencies, and it has been used 
in spam and DDoS prevention.  In PoW, transactions are grouped into a block, validated, and confirmed 
by the miners. The miners are required to solve a challenge by computing cryptographic hashes. They 
achieve this by making trial and error computations until a consensus is reached. PoW works because all 
miners compete to find the nonce, so the block will hash to a target value determined by the mining 
difficulty when the nonce is combined with the proposed block. A proof-of-work puzzle's characteristics 
are: Computationally challenging to compute and easy to verify [26].   
Proof of Stake (PoS): Proof of Stake refers to a method to assign priority in hash calculations per virtual 
currency holding ratio[77]. In PoS, mining new blocks depend on who holds the highest amount of 
cryptocurrency, in which a deterministic algorithm selects nodes according to the number of coins each 
one has. Hence, instead of investing in expensive computational power to mine blocks, miners invest in 
the system's currencies. As a result, a miner’s likelihood of being chosen to create a block depends on the 
fraction of coins the miner owns in the system [78]. For example, someone holding 1% of the Bitcoin can 
mine 1% of the Proof of stake blocks. Proof of stake is based on the idea that a dishonest act committed 
by a node holding a large number of virtual currency reduces the currency's reliability and value.  This 
fact works as an incentive for any participant to avoid dishonest acts.  
Proof of Importance (PoI): A Proof of importance (POI) is a system used to determine which users are 
eligible to perform the calculations necessary to add a new block of data to a blockchain and receive the 
associated payment. A proof of importance algorithm prioritizes miners based on the number of 
transactions in the corresponding cryptocurrency that they perform. The more transactions are made to 
and from an entity’s cryptocurrency wallet, the higher that entity’s chances of being given mining projects 
are. It uses transaction amounts and balances of individual nodes as indicators, calculates each node's 
significance, and assigns priority in hash calculations to more significant nodes. Clustering makes it 
possible to detect nodes that are likely to commit unlawful transactions [79].   
Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT): PBFT is an algorithm for solving a Byzantine Fault 
resulting from a failure in building a consensus caused by the Byzantine general problem. It was 
challenging to put a theoretical algorithm to practical use due to the enormous computation requirement 
[80]. PBFT works in an asynchronous environment that might contain byzantine faults such as the internet. 
The nodes in PBFT are divided into primary and backups. In  PBFT, a client sends a request to the primary. 
The primary assigns the request a sequence number and multicasts a signed pre-prepared message to other 
backups. The pre-prepared contains the view and sequence number. If the backups did not already accept 
a pre-prepared message for the same view and sequence numbers, they would accept the pre-prepared. 
After accepting the pre-prepare, a backup broadcast the signed prepare message. PBFT uses a timeout 
mechanism to deal with fault primaries [80]. 
Incentives for Miners: Incorporating a block into a blockchain requires energy from the miners. To verify 
a transaction and create a block, miners use computation power, which has its cost. Only the miner who 
comes up with the proof for the challenge gets the award for the current block. The rest gets nothing and 
must start working on a new block, and so on. So, for every block in the blockchain, only one miner gets 
awarded. For instance, in the bitcoin blockchain, the miners get bitcoin (BTC) as incentives for 
incorporating a transaction block into the chain, while Ethereum miners get Ethers (ETH) as incentives 
for validating a block[26]. The more transactions are in the block, the more the transaction fees are 
collected if the block is published successfully [75]. 
Gas Limit: The term gas limit refers to the maximum price a cryptocurrency user is willing to pay when 
sending a transaction or performing a smart contract function. In Ethereum, gas fees, measured in gwei,  
are payments made by users to compensate for the computing energy required to process and validate 
transactions. The gas limit refers to the maximum amount of gas (or energy) that a sender is willing to 
spend on a particular transaction. The higher the gas price the sender is willing to pay, the more critical 
the transaction since the miner's reward will be higher [27]. 
Smart Contract: The fundamental purpose behind the inception of Blockchain smart contracts was to 
allow the performance of credible transactions without involving third parties. A smart contract is a code 
stored on the blockchain and automatically executed when predetermined terms and conditions are met.  
A smart contract is a computer program that executes agreements established between at least two parties, 
causing certain actions to happen when a series of specific conditions are met. Thus, when such previously 
programmed conditions occur, the smart contract automatically executes the corresponding clause. In this 
way, the code may translate into legal terms that control physical or digital objects through an executable 
program [30]. 
Simply put, a smart contract works a lot like a vending machine. A smart contract can work on its own, 
and it can also be implemented along with any number of other smart contracts. Smart contract conditions 
are based on data that depends on external services that take data from the real world and store them into 
the blockchain (or vice versa). Their life on the blockchain network ensures they cannot be altered, and 
thus they provide the guarantee of trust that previously required elaborate controls and audit processes 
conducted by trusted third parties and arbitrators. Smart contracts contain complex and detailed 
instructions that automate processes that otherwise require oversight by centralized authorities. They 
eliminate costly duplication of manual effort [31]. In information exchange, smart contracts allow for 
creating dynamic and scalable rules that can be used to exchange patient information securely. They are 
suitable for reorienting processes that add efficiency to systems by the removal of human agents. The 
inclusion of smart contracts in the information exchange adds an extra layer of security that is also efficient 
to healthcare delivery, such as removing trusted third parties, reducing financial costs, inefficiencies, and 
wastage [31].  They can be set up in a way that will be dependent on one another. A smart contract contains 
three integral parts: Signatories, two or more parties agreeing on using the smart contract, subject of 
agreement (i.e., the agreed contract), and the specific term, including the rules, rewards, and punishments 
associated with the subject of the agreement[31]. 
Fork: A fork is defined as what happens when a blockchain diverges into two potential paths or a change 
to the blockchain protocol. (i.e., a situation that occurs when two or more blocks have the same block 
height). Ideally, a unanimous consensus among the blockchain nodes results in a single blockchain 
containing verified data(transactions) that the network asserts to be correct. However, many times, the 
network nodes cannot reach a unanimous consensus regarding the blockchain's future state. This event 
leads to forks in which the ideal 'single' chain of blocks is split into two or more chains, which are all 
valid. Blockchain forks can occur due to new functionality, fixing security issues, or reversing transactions 
[27]. Blockchain forks are mainly divided into two: Hard and soft forks[39].  
Since its inception, blockchain has applications in diverse areas, e.g., health system [32-38], data integrity 
security [39],  intrusion detection system [40-42], and others. Here, we explore its application as an 
alternative and fast method of securely distributing cyberattack features and signatures among different 
participating nodes. Each participating node could represent the gateway of different companies. The 
proposed architecture could serve as a medium where different companies form a consortium to exchange 
attack signatures and features to detect distributed or coordinated attacks promptly. Furthermore, we 
applied the developed architecture to patient health records exchange across different healthcare systems. 
Given that healthcare systems embrace interoperability to deliver better healthcare service to patients, our 
architecture will be practical because it detects and prevents malicious activities on data, thus ensuring the 








BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS 
Several kinds of research have proposed solutions to address secure information sharing among IDS nodes 
in CoIDS over the years. Although some of these methods are practical, they expose the system to other 
vulnerabilities that cyberattacks can exploit. Some of these proposed solutions are discussed below; 
3.1 Cooperative intrusion detection 
The authors in [43] proposed a prototype Distributed Intrusion Detection System (DIDS). The proposed 
system combines distributed monitoring and data reduction with centralized analysis to monitor a 
heterogeneous network of computers. They considered how to track a user moving across the network 
with a new user-id on each computer. The result showed that the prototype demonstrated the viability of 
distributed architecture in solving the network-user identification problem. This solution is practical; 
however, with the DIDS director responsible for all evaluation, the system is susceptible to single-point-
of-failure or man-in-the-middle attacks. Another research in [44] proposed DOMINO (Distributed 
Overlay for Monitoring Internet Outbreaks). DOMINO is an architecture for a distributed intrusion 
detection system that fosters collaboration among heterogeneous nodes organized as an overlay network. 
In their system, they used active-sink nodes that respond to and measure connections to unused IP 
addresses. The configuration enables efficient detection of attacks from spoofed IP sources, reduces false 
positives, enables attack classification and production of timely blacklists. They evaluated DOMINO's 
capabilities and performance using a broad set of intrusion logs collected from different providers across 
the Internet. The result showed that DOMINO helps discriminate between types of attacks by examining 
the payload data. Although their system showed a good result, an attacker can hack the database that 
manages activities, manipulates stored data, or inject fake data into the database. 
In [45], the authors proposed a cooperative intrusion detection system (CoIDS), which uses a cooperative 
approach for intrusion detection. In their method, individual intrusion detection components work 
cooperatively to perform concerted detection. The result showed that the system is efficient and effective 
in preventing viruses from spreading in a chain way. However, with the introduction of an intrusion 
detection manager (IDM), who maintains and updates cooperative protocols, rules, and logs, there is a 
need to trust IDM, which may expose the network to man-in-the-middle or single-point-of-failure attacks. 
In another research put forward in [46], the authors proposed a cooperative intrusion detection framework 
in cloud computing to reduce the impact of denial-of-service attacks (DoS) and distributed denial of 
service attacks (DDoS). Each IDS has a cooperative agent that computes and determines whether to accept 
the alerts sent from other IDS. The result showed that the proposed system only increases little 
computation effort than pure snort-based IDS but prevents the system from a single point of failure attack. 
However, the system failed to address a situation when each cooperative agent uses different IDSs. The 
system is also susceptible to malicious intruder activities such as data hijacking via the medium of 
transmission. 
3.2 Blockchain Application in Intrusion Detection System 
The authors in [47] present a Collaborative Blockchained Signature-based Intrusion Detection 
(CBSigIDS). CBSigIDS is a generic framework of collaborative blockchain signature-IDS. This 
framework utilized blockchains to update a trusted signature database for different IDS nodes in a 
collaborative network incrementally. The experiment investigated the performance of CBSigIDS against 
adversarial scenarios like worm and flooding attacks in simulated collaborative intrusion detection 
systems or networks (CIDN).  In the evaluation, they compared the results from simulated CIDN against 
real CIDN. The result showed that blockchain technology could enhance the robustness and effectiveness 
of signature-based IDSs under adversarial scenarios via building a trusted signature database. Although 
their system works like our proposed architecture, the approach does not incorporate anomaly-based attack 
detection and distribution. Also, the authors failed to address how their architecture detects malicious or 
compromised blockchain nodes.  In [48], the authors proposed a SectNet, an architecture that can secure 
data storage, computing, and sharing in the large-scale Internet environment. The architecture aimed at 
more secure cyberspace with actual big data and enhanced AI with plenty of data sources. Their 
architecture integrates 1) blockchain-based data sharing with ownership guarantee, 2) AI-based secure 
computing platform, and 3) a trusted-value exchange platform. The performance analysis evaluated the 
vulnerability when suffering from notorious network attacks such as the DDoS attacks and the revenue 
for contributors who provide Blockchain's security rules. The result showed that the SectNet significantly 
reduced DDoS attack's impact due to the sharing of the security rule sets by every internet user. The 
contributor's revenue will also increase at a higher rate if the shared security rules are of higher quality, 
especially after the real market's quality effect is formed. Based on the analysis, the work is specific to 
DDoS attacks, and it does not address how it can detect compromised insider nodes. Also, the authors 
failed to explain how stored information is verified.  
Further research put forward by [49] presents a trust chain that mitigates attacks that aim at compromising 
intrusion detection systems. The proposed solution is to protect the integrity of the information shared 
among the CIDN peers, enhance their accountability, and secure their collaboration by thwarting insider 
attacks. A consensus protocol is proposed for CIDNs as a combination of proof-of-stake and proof-of-
work protocols that enable collaborative IDS nodes to maintain a reliable and tampered-resistant trust 
chain. Their work focused on the theoretical aspects of security, to study a series of attacks reported in 
both domains (trust management and Blockchain), to fully understand the impact of various parameter 
choices on the proposed solution's security and the dynamics governing the trust score evolution. Although 
the research work has a prospect of securing shared information integrity from insider attacks, it failed to 
address external attack detection and data protection. Another piece in [50] presents a Blockchain-Based 
Malware Detection Framework (B2MDF) for detecting malicious mobile applications in mobile 
applications marketplaces (app stores). The framework consists of two internal and external private 
blockchains forming a dual private blockchain and a consortium blockchain for the final decision. The 
internal private blockchain stores feature blocks extracted by both static and dynamic feature extractors, 
while the external blockchain stores detection results as blocks for current versions of applications. The 
result showed that B2MDF does not limit the implementation of any specific machine learning algorithms. 
B2MDF also provides useful features for third parties to develop their antimalware solutions as app stores 
may be more accurate in extracting features from a new uploaded sample.  
In [25], The authors proposed a blockchain-based web attack detection model that uses a signature-based 
detection method. In their work, the signature-based detection looks for specific patterns against three 
known web-based attack types: Structured Query Language (SQL) Injection, Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), 
Command Injection. Three web servers are used for the experimental study. The installed blockchain node 
used multichain applications for each server. The attack signatures detected and defined by a web 
application are updated in the blockchain lists and used by all web applications. The result showed that 
the solution was able to detect these attacks. However, the approach failed to address signature sharing, 
and also, it cannot be applied to anomaly-based IDS. The authors in [51]  proposed a novel business model 
of data sharing in multiple clouds, where a blockchain-based platform is designed to provide an ecological 
system. The model consisted of three types of participants: data owners, miners, and third parties. The 
data is shared via blockchain and recorded by a smart contract. These participants may acquire and store 
the sharing of data using their private or public clouds. They leverage the Shapley value to construct a 
dynamic and equitable incentive scheme for data sharing in multiple clouds. They analyze the participants' 
topological relationships and develop some Shapley value models from simple to complicated revenue 
distribution. The result showed that the reliable collaboration model provided innovations that realize the 
dynamic distribution of revenue by Shapley value. They proved that their solution could encourage more 
clouds to contribute their data and improved data authenticity as far as possible through verification and 
analysis. The method failed to address how participants are authenticated to deter or detect malicious 
activities.  
In [52], the authors proposed the development of Distributed Intrusion Detection System (DIDS) using 
Blockchain over a stable platform like cloud infrastructure. In their work, they tested the performance of 
the overall system with Autoscaling. They showed the performance of the DIDS server with a varying 
load of data. They noted many other issues like communication delay, the overhead of blockchain, cost of 
implementation, and so on, which must be discussed and analyzed. In [53], the authors investigated and 
demonstrated several collaborative intrusion detection methods to analyze blockchain's suitability and 
security for collaborative intrusion detection systems. They also studied the difference between the 
existing means of integrating intrusion detection systems with blockchain and categorized the significant 
vulnerabilities of blockchain with their potential losses and current enhancements for mitigation. Their 
survey recommended more studies in implementing CIDS with blockchain and other hardware security 
modules like HSM to elevate IoT devices' security, especially the newly emerging autonomous cars. The 
authors in [54] proposed the virtual reality parallel anti-DDoS chain design philosophy and distributed 
anti-D Chain detection framework based on hybrid ensemble learning. They utilized AdaBoost and 
Random Forest as their ensemble learning strategy, and lightweight classifiers such as CART and ID3 are 
integrated into the same ensemble learning algorithm. The blockchain scene's detection framework has 
much stronger generalization performance, universality, and complementarity to accurately identify the 
onslaught features for DDoS attacks in a P2P network. The experimental results confirmed that the 
distributed heterogeneous anti-D chain detection method performs better in six important indicators (such 
as Precision, Recall, F-Score, True Positive Rate, False Positive Rate, and ROC curve).  
The authors in [40], [41], and [42] proposed the use of blockchain technology in detecting anomalies in 
computer networks. In [40], the authors proposed a blockchain anomaly detection (BAD) solution that 
focused on detecting attacks directed at the blockchain network. BAD prevented the insertion of a 
malicious transaction from spreading further in the Blockchain. BAD leveraged blockchain metadata 
named forks to collect potentially malicious activities in the blockchain network. Their works used 
machine learning to train blockchain nodes to detect malicious activities. In their approach, they 
considered an eclipse attack (an attacker infects a node's list of IP addresses, thus forcing the victim's node 
list of IP addresses to be controlled by an attacker). The result analysis showed that BAD could detect and 
stop the spread of attack that uses bitcoin forks to spread malicious codes. However, the solution is specific 
to attacks directed towards the blockchain network and that uses bitcoin forks. In another research put 
forward in [41],  the authors proposed collaborative IoT anomaly detection via blockchain solution 
(CIoTA). CIoTA uses the blockchain concept to perform distributed and collaborative anomaly detection 
on IoT devices. They used CIoTA to continuously train anomaly detection models separately and then 
combined their wisdom to differentiate between rare benign events and malicious activities. The 
evaluation of the result showed that combined models could detect malware activities easily with zero 
false positives. The proposed solution relies on IoT devices' collaborative effort to detect attacks; hence, 
it cannot share attack signatures or features among different nodes, and it is specific to malware attacks. 
The authors in [42] proposed a blockchain-based malware detection solution in mobile devices. Their work 
extracted installation package, permission package, call graph package features for all known malware 
families for Android-based mobile devices and used them to build a feature database. Their result showed 
that the solution could detect and classify known malware. It can also perform malice determination and 
malware family classification on unknown software with higher accuracy and lower time cost. However, 
the solution is specific to signature-based malware attacks on Android-based mobile devices: hence, it will 
be challenging to apply it to anomaly-based attacks.  
3.3 Blockchain Application in Healthcare 
Healthcare industries generate a massive amount of data in the form of patient information daily, and this 
information needs to be secured, more specifically now that healthcare providers are proposing robust inter-
healthcare operability. Due to data security reasons, blockchain becomes a tamperproof means of ensuring 
healthcare data integrity and consistency. Blockchain application in healthcare industries is still in its 
inception. However, the potential it offers, the deficiencies and gaps it fills (e.g., ensuring the security and 
confidentiality EHRs) place it at the forefront to be adopted by healthcare providers recently. Blockchain 
technology has been proposed in different kinds of researches to secure personal health records. Several 
kinds of research have proposed blockchain technology in the healthcare industry for data sharing. For 
instance, The authors in [55] propose a platform that enables a secure and private health record system by 
separating sensitive and non-sensitive data. The platform serves to share patients’ healthcare data with 
researchers without revealing the patients’ privacy. The model successfully uses proxy re-encryption 
techniques to share a patient's sensitive data without revealing the private key and adopting an asymmetric 
cryptography technique to encrypt these data while storing it on the cloud. In a similar work in [56], the 
authors proposed i-Blockchain, which uses a permissioned blockchain to preserve the patient's health data 
(PHD) privacy and improve an individual’s data exchange experience. It allows only qualified individuals 
and healthcare service providers (HSP) to join the network to prevent malicious intruders. It used cold 
storage functions as off-blockchain storage and hot storage functions as the store where users temporarily 
put requested data, a private key, and a public key for secure data exchange. 
Furthermore, the authors in [57] proposed a conceptual design for sharing personal continuous dynamic 
health data using blockchain technology. The authors supplemented the approach with cloud storage. They 
used hash pointers to the storage location to solve the problem of sharing large-sized continuous-dynamic 
data while integrating blockchain and cloud storage. Extensive size data can be stored in an encrypted 
format on the cloud, and only the transactional data and metadata can be saved and shared on the 
blockchain. The authors in [58] proposed a decentralized record management system (MedRec) to manage 
authentication, confidentiality, accountability, and data sharing of EHRs using blockchain technology. It 
is a modular design that integrates with patients' local data storage and encourages medical stakeholders 
to participate as miners.  The result showed that the system enables the emergence of big data to empower 
researchers while engaging the patient and providers in the choice of release metadata. A new approach 
which joins blockchain and cloud computing network was proposed in [59]. In their work, they employed 
Amazon Web Services and Ethereum blockchain to facilitate the sematic level interoperability of EHRs 
systems without standardized data forms and formatting. The model proposed an interoperability data 
sharing framework that includes security through multilayer encryption, optical data storage through 
Amazon Web Service, and transfer using the Ethereum blockchain. The authors in [60] proposed a 
blockchain platform architecture for clinical trial and precision medicine. The work identified four new 
architecture components required to build on top of traditional blockchain and discussed architectural 
challenges. The four components discussed in the paper are: (a) a new blockchain-based general 
distributed and parallel computing paradigm component to devise and study parallel computing 
methodology for big data analytics, (b) a blockchain application data management component for data 
integrity, big data integration, and integrating disparity of medical-related data, (c) verifiable anonymous 
identity management component for identity privacy for both personal and IoT devices and secure data 
access to make possible of the patient-centric medicine, and (d) trust data-sharing management component 
to enable a trust medical data ecosystem for collaborative research.  
In [61], the work described evaluation metrics to assess blockchain-based distributed applications (DApps) 
based on their feasibility, intended capability, and compliance in the healthcare domain. In their work, 
they highlighted seven crucial metrics for evaluating DApps designed to improve healthcare 
interoperability. The metrics highlighted in their work are (a) the entire workflow should be HIPAA 
compliant, (b) The blockchain platform should support Turing completeness, (c) DApp should support 
user identifiability and authentication, (d) DApp should support structural interoperability at minimum, 
(e) scalability across large populations of healthcare participants, (f) support of patient-centered care 
model, (g) cost-effectiveness compared to existing approaches. In [62], the authors presented a 
blockchain-supported architectural framework for secure personal data control in a health information 
exchange by pairing user-generated acceptable use policies with smart contracts. Their system adopted a 
user-centric approach for processing patient medical health data using processing nodes in the blockchain-
based system. The scheme monitors data after reception by the requester and by policy destroys the data 
if violations occur or after the period allocated for computation expires based on smart contracts. They 
performed a comparative performance analysis of access control and privacy preservation considerations 
between their framework and other works from the literature. The result showed that their framework has 
a better performance than other works from the literature. 
Despite the number of proposed solutions, blockchain applications have not addressed the security 
problems associated with data exchange in cooperative intrusion detection systems. Since the shared 
information is dynamic, needs to be accurate, tamperproof, and consistent, there is a need to continuously 
monitor the information for any malicious activities from both insider and outsider threat actors. This serves 
as the motivation for this work. We propose an architecture that uses blockchain technology to secure and 
incrementally update attack features and signatures and detect any malicious activities in the distributed 
database in real-time. The proposed system facilitates scalable attack features or signature exchange, 
presents the information in a standard format that encourages heterogeneous IDS node participation, 
authenticates and verifies every transaction. It is also robust to public IDS nodes joining and leaving the 
blockchain network in real-time. The proposed architecture can ensure secure patients’ health information 


















The proposed architecture, which is compatible with any blockchain platform,  is built on the Ethereum 
blockchain platform. Ethereum blockchain is an open-source blockchain platform that can handle many 
concurrent transactions, making it scalable [63]. Apart from this, the Ethereum blockchain platform is 
flexible and compatible with standard operating systems. It is a blockchain-based distributed computing 
featuring smart contracts. A smart contract is an agreement among members of a consortium, stored on the 
chain and run by all participants [64]. Although the Ethereum platform is a public blockchain, in this work, 
we configure and run it as a private blockchain network that can accept public nodes without permission. 
Thus, the architecture possesses the features of private and public blockchain networks. We configured the 
Ethereum blockchain as a private blockchain by editing the configuration file that houses the genesis block. 
The customed configuration file makes our blockchain network invisible to random public nodes, and any 
node that wants to connect to the blockchain network will run the same customed configuration file. The 
customed genesis block ensures that other random nodes cannot interact with the blockchain network.  It 
combines private, and public blockchain attributes to store and distribute cyberattack features and 
signatures securely. It is a private blockchain because only authorized nodes can prepare, verify, and 
validate transactions, while it is regarded as a public blockchain because public nodes do not need 
permission to join or leave the network. Figure 4 shows a pictorial representation of the proposed 
architecture. 
 
Fig. 4. The Pictorial representation of the Proposed Architecture 
The architecture is composed mainly of the following: 
• Authorized Nodes 
The authorized nodes are also known as miners. The nodes set up the terms and conditions in the 
smart contract. They are the trusted nodes that are privileged to prepare, submit, and verify 
transactions. They can be stand-alone nodes or gateways to other networks. They also run the 
consensus algorithm, thus validate transaction blocks. All authorized nodes update the database. 
• Unauthorized Nodes 
These are also known as public nodes. They join the network to retrieve stored attack information. 
They can also be stand-alone nodes or gateways to other networks. Public nodes do not submit 
transactions to the blockchain because they are not trusted. Hence, they are not privileged to 
prepare, verify, validate, or run consensus algorithm. They do not update the database but can only 
request the transaction address of the mined blocks. 
• Database 
The database, which is accessible to all nodes, stores the address of the mined blocks. While all 
public nodes have read-only access to it, authorized nodes update block information. The database 
also stores the blockchain network’s genesis block. The genesis block is required by every node 
that wants to join the blockchain network. Apart from the genesis block, the database houses 
information about published blocks. Any data manipulation in the database results in an inability 
to join or access the blockchain's contents but does not affect the stored data. Such malicious 
activity can be easily detected. 
The proposed architecture is divided into three main stages, as shown below.  
 
 
Fig. 5. Building blocks of the proposed architecture 
4.1 Extraction 
The extraction stage explains how signatures are retrieved from signature-based IDSs (details in 
Chapter Five). Attack signatures are rules written in a signature-based IDS to detect specific attacks. 
If the rules are correctly written, signature-based IDSs have the best accuracy in detecting known 
attacks, but it is almost impossible to detect unknown attacks (zero-day attacks).  The extraction stage 
explains attack launch on a host,  type of IDSs utilized, the composition of attack rule, attack detection, 
and transaction formation. Furthermore,  it explains features extraction from the anomaly-based IDS 
using developed scripts and network sniffing tools (details in Chapter six). Finally, we describe how 
the system prepares a transaction from the extracted signature or features and submits it to the 
blockchain platform for verification. 
4.2 Storage 
We describe the steps involved in verifying a submitted transaction and the transaction owner's 
authentication procedures. The section explains how the architecture authenticates every transaction 
sender and continuously monitors the node’s behavior to detect malicious activities without a 
centralized authentication server. Instead of monitoring the node’s behavior using a centralized server, 
the architecture achieves the result using a decentralized smart contract code running on the blockchain 
network. Furthermore, the section describes how the system converts successfully verified transactions 
to agreed-upon standard format using some novel approach. Finally, it explains the steps involved in 
transaction validation. The storage section explains how the system validates transactions using an 
iterative process such as a proof-of-work algorithm and incorporates a proof-of-stake algorithm to 
limit a miner's influence on a submitted transaction. We describe how the nodes confirm a block of 
transactions using nonce value and attach it to the chain. 
4.3 Distribution 
The distribution stage describes the steps involved in retrieving the content of a new block. The section 
describes how authorized nodes update the database and how transaction information is retrieved to 
query the blockchain network. Also, the distribution stage describes the information needed for a 




ATTACK SIGNATURE ARCHITECTURE 
Figure 6 shows the detailed processing blocks in the extraction, storage, and distribution of the attack 
signatures extracted from any signature-based IDS 
 
 
   
Fig. 6. Processing blocks of Attack Signatures 
 
5.1 Signature Extraction 
Attack signatures are rules written in signature-based IDSs to detect attacks. The IDS monitors the 
incoming network traffic and compares it to these rules. If the traffic pattern is similar to any of the 
predefined rules, an alert is generated. The attack signature that detects such an attack is retrieved from 
the IDS. In this work, we utilized three common signature-based IDSs; Snort[23], Bro[65], Suricata[66]. 
These IDSs are open-source IDSs that are downloaded and installed on our blockchain nodes. Rules to 
detect different types of attacks, such as Denial of Service (DoS), ICMP ping, etc., are written in the Snort 
IDS. We developed a python script that can extract these rules. Whenever an attack is detected, the specific 
rule used to detect such an attack is retrieved from the IDS using a developed script.  Table I shows an 
example of a retrieved signature or rule. 
Table I: Retrieved signature 
 
S/N IDS SIGNATURE 
1 Snort alert TCP ! $ any any -> $HOME_NET 80 (flags: 





• S/N: Serial number of retrieved signatures. 
• IDS: The  IDS that detects the attack. We experimented with Snort, Bro and Suricata. 
• SIGNATURE: The IDS signature or rule that detects the attack. 
A transaction is prepared based on retrieved signatures in  Table I and signed by the owner using its private 
key. Every authorized node has unique key pair (public pk and secret pk), and each node is identified by 
its public key, transaction account, MAC, and IP addresses. The owner submits the digitally signed 
transaction to the blockchain network for verification. We introduce an extra step that authenticates the 
transaction senders to ensure that only authorized node transactions can be validated. As part of this action, 
the transaction owner submits a transaction tag (owner’s details) that includes transaction account, MAC, 
and IP addresses alongside with transaction.  Table II shows the transaction submitted to the blockchain 
network. 
Table II. Format of Submitted Signature 
S/N Type SIGNATUREsecret_pk Transaction Tag 
1 Snort alert TCP ! $ any any -> $HOME_NET 
80 (flags: S; msg:"Possible DoS"; 
count 70, seconds 10; 
sid:10001;rev:1;).  
 





5.2 Signature Storage 
The transaction owner is authenticated, and the submitted transaction (i.e., Table II) is verified. The 
successfully verified signature is converted to an agreed-upon standard format and validated. All 
verification and signature conversion are handled on the server-side of the architecture, i.e., smart contract, 
while transaction validation is handled by blockchain consensus protocol. The accepted format of 
submitted signature (Table II), public keys, and authorized nodes information are already coded in the 
smart contract. Also, signature conversion script (Algorithm 2) and signature format creation script 
(Algorithm3) are coded into the smart contract and mined to the blockchain. Thus, smart contract handles 
the following functions:  
5.2.1 Node Authentication 
The smart contract handles the node authentication. The purpose of authenticating the node is to ensure 
that all transaction submissions are restricted to authorized nodes only (i.e., it ensures that public nodes' 
transactions are detected). The smart contract retrieves the transaction tag and invokes the smart contract 
code that compares it with stored information. The information confirmed at this stage includes the 
transaction account, MAC and IP addresses, and the private key. We recognized that hackers could easily 
spoof the MAC and IP addresses in a highly unsecured environment; hence, we add a multifactor 
authentication process that involves verifying the transaction account and private key in addition to the 
verified MAC and IP addresses. The pseudocode in Algorithm 1 describes the snippet of the smart contract 
that handles the node's authentication. The smart contract invokes the code that reads the transaction tag. 
It verifies the digital signature using the owner’s public key (o.pk) and confirms the transaction account, 
MAC, and IP addresses. If the node authentication is successful, the algorithm invokes the transaction 
verification code. For a node to be successfully authenticated, the sender must be authorized, and the 
digital signature must be verified. If any of these steps fail, the node’s transaction is dropped. 
 
5.2.2 Transaction verification and standard format creation 
 
The transaction verification step ensures that all malicious transactions or activities on the submitted 
transaction by insider threat actors are detected and prevented. (i.e., it detects and prevents compromised 
authorized nodes from participating). This step also ensures that any submitted transaction's integrity and 
consistency are verified before attaching it to the blockchain network. We defined a code that checks the 
submitted signature's mandatory variables and converts it to the smart contract's agreed standard format. 
The piece of pseudocode in Algorithm 2 describes how a retrieved signature is converted to the standard 
format. The standard format is created based on what we defined as mandatory variables. Mandatory 
variables are variables that must be present in an attack rule. Examples of mandatory variables are action, 
source address, source port, destination address, destination port, message, protocol, flag, time, data rate, 
rev, and sid. Mandatory variables are needed for a signature to be able to detect an attack. These variables 
Algorithm1: Node Authentication 
Require: 
 Mapping (pubkey=>bytes32) public Keys; 
 Mapping (account => bytes32) public Account; 
Mapping (ip_addr=>bytes32) public IP; 
 Mapping (mac_addr => bytes32) public MAC; 
  
 procedure: ReadOwnerData (Transaction tag) 
  Transaction.owner ←msg.sender 
  Transaction.account ← account 
  Transaction.pubkey ← o.pk 
  Transaction.ip ← ip_addr 
  Transaction.mac ←mac_addr 
  Return TRUE 
 end procedure 
  
procedure: NodeAuthentication (OwnerData) 
 require (ip_addr ∈ IP) 
 require (mac_addr ∈ MAC) 
 require (pubkey ∈ Keys) 
 require (account ∈ Account) 
require (o.pk verifies digital signature) 




give unique details about the attack and are similar in all types of signature-based IDS. The format creation 
script's snippet is developed based on the mandatory variables. The algorithm checks for these variables 
in the retrieved signature. If any of the mandatory variables are empty, the algorithm returns an error, and 
the signature is dropped. Otherwise, the algorithm reads these values and assign them to corresponding 
standard format variables. We ignore any other standard format variables without equivalent values from 




Algorithm 2: Signature Conversion 
Require: 
 Mapping(transaction => struct) public Signature; 
  
 procedure: ReadSigMandatoryVar (submitted signature) 
  Signature.action ←action 
  Signature.protocol ← protocol 
  Signature.sourceip ←src_ip 
  Signature.destinationip ← dest_ip 
  Signature.sourceport ←src_port 
  Signature.destinationport ← dest_port 
Signature.message ←msg 
  Signature.sid ← sid 
  Signature.rev ←rev 
  return TRUE 
 end procedure 
  
procedure: SignatureConversion (signature) 
 require (action != NULL) 
 require (protocol != NULL) 
 require (src_ip != NULL) 
 require (dest_ip != NULL) 
 require (src_port != NULL) 
 require (dest_port != NULL) 
 require (msg != NULL) 
 require (sid != NULL) 
 require(rev != NULL 
 Signature.push[values] => Format.values 




5.2.3 Signature Validation 
Blockchain protocols handle the validation of transactions. In this work, the blockchain platform uses both 
Proof-of-Work (PoW) and Proof-of-Stake (PoS). The pending transaction is built into a block, and the 
block is broadcasted into the blockchain network for validation. The authorized nodes (miners) work to 
validate the block. Figure 7 shows the process of building transactions into blocks and how blocks are 
chained together. Each block contains a unique code called hash; it also includes a hash of the previous 
block. Data of earlier blocks are encrypted or hashed into a series of numbers and letters. The authorized 
nodes work to get the target hash to validate a block. A target hash is a number that a hashed block header 
must be less than or equal to for a new block to be awarded. The miners achieve this target hash by using 
an iterative process such as PoW, which requires consensus from all authorized nodes. The PoW is a 
mathematic calculation performed by every authorized node that competes to validate a block. The 
characteristics of PoW are computationally difficult to compute and easy to verify. We set an upper bound 
of stake for every transaction to ensure fair competition among miners (i.e., to discourage authorized nodes 
with a larger stake from always emerge as the miner).  
The process of guessing the hash starts in the block header. It contains a block version number, a 
timestamp, the hash used in the previous block, the hash of the Merkle Root, the nonce, and the target 
hash. Successfully mining a block requires an authorized node to be the first to guess the nonce and 
broadcast it to other nodes. Other trusted nodes verify the nonce value's correctness by appending this 
number to the block's hashed contents and then rehashing it. If the new hash meets the target's 
requirements, then the block is added to the Blockchain. The transaction is permanently stored on the 




Fig. 7 Transaction Validation block 
5.3 Signature Distribution 
After a successful validation process, the blockchain issues a transaction address to the owner (sender). 
Each node’s ledger is updated, and the transaction is ready to be retrieved. The steps involved in the secure 
distribution of mined signature  are as  follows: 
5.3.1 Ledger Updating 
The newly added block reflects on the ledger, which is possessed by every node in the network. The 
transaction address is sent to the database by the transaction owner. This database is opened to the public 
to obtain a copy of the block address.  
5.3.2 Signature Retrieval 
All blockchain nodes receive the newly added block notification but do not have access to the block's 
content. The transaction address obtained from the database is used to retrieve information stored in the 
new block. Nodes extract the stored attack signatures and convert them into the format of their signature-
based intrusion detection systems. 
5.4 RESULT 
We implemented the proposed system on the Ethereum blockchain platform. We use Solidity v 0.5.4 
implementation of Ethereum for the smart contract and geth v 1.4.18 for Ethereum. The Blockchain 
network was set up in the laboratory with five blockchain nodes, one database node, and one attack node. 
We implement four authorized nodes ( to ensure consensus of miners during the validation stage) and one 
unauthorized (public) node in the setup. To make an authorized node, we write the node’s information 
into the smart contract and mine it to the blockchain network. Before a public node joins the network, it 
retrieves a copy of the genesis block information from the database. Four nodes run Ubuntu Linux18.04, 
while one node runs Ubuntu Linux 16.04. Table III shows the configuration of each blockchain node.  
Table III: Blockchain node configurations 
Node OS RAM Processor 
Authorized node 1 Desktop, Ubuntu 16.04 4GB 2.2GHz 
Authorized node 2 Laptop, Ubuntu 18.04 16GB 2.81GHz 
Authorized node 3 Desktop, Ubuntu 18.04 8GB 2.44GHz 
Authorized node 4 Laptop, Ubuntu 18.04 4GB 2.44GHz 
Unauthorized node  Laptop, Ubuntu 18.04 4GB 2.40GHz 
Attack node  Laptop, Ubuntu 16.04 4GB 2.20GHz 
Database node Desktop, Windows 10 4GB i5 @2.44GHz 
 
We randomly installed the three signature-based IDSs on the blockchain nodes. Snort v2.9.7 was installed 
on authorized nodes 1, 2, and the unauthorized node. Bro v2.6.1 was installed on authorized nodes 2, 3, 
and unauthorized node, and Suricata v 4.1.3 was installed on authorized node 4. The transaction accounts, 
public keys,  IP, and MAC addresses of all authorized nodes are written in smart contract lists and mined 
into the blockchain. In authorized node 2, we set a rule to detect a denial of service (DoS) attack on the 
local rule file of its snort IDS, and we start Snort in monitoring mode.  
Attack rule: alert tcp ! $ any any -> $HOME_NET 80 (flags: S; msg:"Possible DoS"; flow: stateless; 
threshold: type both, track by_src, count 70, seconds 2; sid:10001;rev:1;)  
Attack node launches a DoS attack to authorized node2 using hping3 syn packet. 
DoS attack: hping3 -i --flood -S -d 120 -p 80 192.168.1.144(Home_net) 
The target (authorized node 2) detects the attack, retrieves the signature, and submits it as a transaction to 
the blockchain network. The transaction is verified, converted to a standard format, and distributed among 
other blockchain nodes. The retrieved standard format transaction is shown in Table IV. Based on the 
Table, we can conclude that the architecture can present attack signatures in a standard format that other 
IDS nodes can easily understand, thus, enhancing heterogeneous IDS participation. 
Table IV:  The formatted retrieved signature 
Standard Format Variable Signature Values 
Action Alert 
Protocol TCP 
Source IP Any 
Source port Any 
Destination IP Home_net 
Destination port 80 
Flags S 
Message Possible DoS 
flow ------ 
Data rate >70 




5.4.1 Performance Analysis 
We defined the transaction dissemination latency as the metric for measuring the performance of the 
architecture. To evaluate the transaction latency, we obtain the following data for each transaction from 
every node in the blockchain network.  
• Transaction deployment time (t1): This is the time a transaction is submitted to the network. These 
data are collected directly from the sender terminal. 
• Execution time (t2): This is the time taken for the formatted signature to appear in each node's 
designated files. The time is retrieved by setting on current time on all nodes. 
 
5.4.1.1 Transaction Dissemination Latency 
The transaction dissemination latency is also known as the response time (measured in seconds) of the 
blockchain network. For each transaction, latency is the difference between the execution time and the 
deployment time (t2-t1). Latency includes the time elapse for authentication, verification and conversion, 
mining, and time spent to retrieve mined signatures. Figure 8 shows the response time of each node for 
every transaction. We observed that the 6th transaction latency was the smallest while the 4th and 8th 
transaction has the highest latencies for all nodes. It has been shown that mining time significantly 
influences blockchain network latency since it involves iteration-thus it is not deterministic for all 
transactions. Also, verification time (format conversion) influences the network latency. The high 
dissemination latency, therefore, could be a result of the high mining time.  Figure 9 shows the average 
response time of each node for twenty consecutive transactions. The average response time is the addition 
of all response times for each transaction divided by the number of transactions. We can see that the 
average response time for all nodes is less than 3 seconds. 
Furthermore, figure 10 shows the percentage of time elapse at each stage of the transaction processing. 
The graph shows the percentage of time expended in each stage. In the verification stage that involves 
authentication of the sender, transaction verification, and conversion, 39% of the time was spent. While 
in the validation stage, which involves an iterative process of guessing the target hash, 60% of the time 
was spent, and the update stage only expends 1% of the time.  
 
Fig 8. Dissemination latency for Transactions 
 































Time Analysis of the Proposed Architecture
CHAPTER SIX 
 
ATTACK FEATURES ARCHITECTURE 
 
The features building block is divided into three main steps, as shown in Figure 11. The owner 
authentication, validation, and transaction distribution processes follow the same description as in Chapter 




Fig. 11. The Building blocks of Features Distribution 
 
6.1 Features Extraction 
 
Network traffic is made up of connections and packets sent between the hosts. Every network traffic or 
packet has characteristics that distinguish it from other traffic; these characteristics are known as features. 
Attack features are distinguishing information of attack traffic that differentiates them from regular traffic. 
Anomaly-based IDSs are trained to identify attack traffic. They are trained with features extracted from 
regular (standard) traffic to establish a regular pattern and used the pattern to detect any known traffic 
pattern deviation. Anomaly-based IDS has been shown to have the capabilities of detecting zero-day 
attacks with high accuracy [9,10]. In this work, we analyze the network traffic when IDS alerts and extract 
the features based on attack feature description in the KDD dataset [67] using network traffic analyzing 
tools.  Attack features are extracted under two categories: (i) Connection features and (ii) packet features. 
6.1.1 Connection Features 
These features are obtained from connections an attacker makes with the network. We developed a script 
that analyzes attack connections in real-time. The script continuously sniffs the network traffic while 
waiting for an IDS alert. Whenever an attack is detected, the script captures and analyzes network 
connections using tcpdump v4.9.2., libpcap v1.9.0, tcptrace v6.6.0, and Wireshark v3.0.1. Tcpdump 
captures and analyzes TCP packets, while Wireshark uses libpcap to capture network connections in real-
time. Tcptrace is used to analyze the captured connections. Some of the features extracted from attack 
connections are shown below in Table V. 
Table V: Features generated from attack connections 
S/N Feature Name Definition 
1 Source Port  Port from which attack is launched. 
2 Destination Port Target port in the target network. 
3 Source IP The IP address of the attack node. 
4 Destination IP Target IP address in the target network 
5 Source Bytes The total number of bytes sent from attack nodes. 
6 Destination Bytes The total number of bytes sent from the target network to attack 
nodes. 
7 Source Packets The total number of packets sent from attack nodes. 
8 Connection The total number of connections initiated with the target network 
by attack node. 
9 Duration Total time elapsed during an attack. 
10 Packets/seconds  The number of packets sent by an attack node within 1 second. 
11 Source Host count The total number of attack nodes connecting to the target 
network. 
12 Destination Host Count The total number of target nodes in the target network. 
13 Throughput  The rate at which attack nodes send bytes to the target node. 
(measured in kbps). 
14 Service Count The total number of ports connected to by attack nodes during 
the attack period. 
15 Same service count  The total number of connections to the same port number during 
the attack period. 
16 Different Host rate  Percentage of attack nodes attacking different target nodes. 
17 Same service rate  Percentage of attack nodes attacking the same port. 
18 Same Host rate  Percentage of attack nodes attacking the same target node. 
 
6.1.2 Packet Features 
These features are obtained from the packets sent to a target node from the attack node. These features are 
obtained by capturing and analyzing attack packets’ header. A snippet of the developed script listens for 
IDS alert and starts capturing and analyzing ingress packets using Scapy v 2.4.0 in real-time. Scapy 
decodes traffic packets and matches request with replies. Whenever an IDS alerts for an attack, the script 
starts capturing, analyzing, and extracting the attack packet headers' defined features. Table VI shows 
some of the packet features extracted. 
  Table VI:  Features generated from attack packets 
S/N Feature Name Definition 
1 Land  '1' if the source and destination IP and ports are the same; otherwise, 
'0'. 
2 Type of service Class of traffic assigned to attack packet 
3 Protocol  Higher layer protocol used in the data portion of the attack packet  
4 Ip flags  How packet should be routed or processed by a higher layer 
5 TCP Flags Defines the type of packet sent by the attack node 
6 Urgent  Indicates priority of handling packets by the router 
7 Time to Live Time left for a packet to be discarded 
8 Checksum  Error checking in the packet header 
9 Wrong Fragment  '1' if the checksum is 'incorrect'; otherwise, '0.' 
 
Based on feature values in Tables V and VI, a node prepares a transaction, signs it with the private key, and 
submits it to the blockchain network for verification. As discussed earlier, the transaction sender submits a 
transaction tag that contains the information about the sender. Table VII presents the transaction submitted 
to the blockchain network for verification. 
Table VII: Submitted Transaction 
Class (FEATURES)priv_key Transaction tag 
DCA Signed Features (Combination of Tables V 
and VI) 





• Class: This describes the type of anomaly-based IDS. In this case, it indicates Dendritic Cell 
Algorithm (DCA). 
• (FEATURES)priv_key: This is the signed features. The signed transaction combines the packet 
and connection feature names 
• Verification information: Additional security information  
 
6.2 Storage 
The conformity of the submitted transaction with feature format is first verified. In this case, the algorithm 
ensures that no features field is empty or missing.  The architecture also verifies the sender's privilege to 
submit transactions and the gas price of mining the transaction. The smart contract converts successfully 
verified transaction to the agreed-upon standard format useful by other nodes and push it to the validation 
stage. (i.e., attached to the blockchain). The storage stage is divided into the following steps: 
6.2.1 Transaction and Owners verification 
The node authentication process is discussed in chapter five. The feature verification procedure ensures 
that all malicious transactions or activities on the submitted features are promptly identified and prevented. 
(i.e., it prevents malicious authorized nodes from compromising submitted features). The verification 
stage ensures that any submitted transaction conforms with the agreed-upon standard format, which other 
IDS nodes can use. The verification also ensures that there is enough information to identify such attacks 
by other IDS quickly. In the smart contract, we defined the threshold gas price of mining a transaction 
since transactions are submitted in a similar format, making their prices almost identical.  Any transaction 
costs higher than the threshold are flagged and results in a failed transaction. To ensure fair mining 
competitions among authorized nodes,  we limit the stake that a node can put on a transaction, and we also 
define who should not mine a submitted transaction. Here, we set a mining policy that alerts when 
transaction owners attempt to mine their transactions. The smart contract review and compares the stake 
of each transaction and keeps track of all nodes participating in mining a transaction. 
Furthermore, we defined the format for submitted transactions. The structure of the format contains the 
features name in Tables V and VI. A snippet from the smart contract runs through the submitted transaction 
to ensure no missing feature values are present. We generate the key pairs using Digital Signature 
Algorithm ( DSA) (details in next chapter). The public key of all the authorized nodes is written in the 
smart contract, while the private key is kept securely within the nodes. A snippet from a smart contract 
shows algorithm 4 pseudocode that describes the verification process. For features verification to be 
successful, no feature fields must be empty (i.e., all feature fields must have values), and the transaction 
owner must not mine its transaction. Also,  the stake and cost of mining any transactions must not exceed 
the threshold. If any of these conditions fail, the transaction fails, and it is dropped. A successfully verified 




6.2.2 Features Validation and Distribution 
The pending transaction is built into a block, and the block is broadcasted into the blockchain network for 
validation. Every node receives a broadcasted block, but only authorized nodes (miners) work to validate 
the block. The validation and distribution process follows the same steps as described earlier in chapter 
five. 
6.3 RESULT 
We implemented the proposed system in the laboratory and on the google cloud platform. The aim is to 
compare the architecture's behavior of the two deployments (i.e., when the nodes are close to each other 
and far apart). We set up eight blockchain nodes, one database node, and one attack node for the lab 
implementation while utilizing seven blockchain nodes in the google platform. We deployed one 
blockchain node in each available seven google cloud regions around the United States for the cloud 
implementation. Table VIII shows the configuration of lab nodes, while Figure 12 shows the cloud 
Algorithm 4: Transaction Verification 
Require: 
 Mapping(data => struct) public Features; 
 Mapping (miners => struct) public Miners 
  
 procedure: ReadFeature (Submitted transaction ) 
  Transaction.format ← feature_fields 
  Transaction.gasprice ← cost 
  Transaction.miner ← miners 
  Transaction.owner ← msg.sender 
  Miner.stake ← stake 
  return TRUE 
 end procedure 
  
procedure: FeatureVerification (Transaction) 
 require (feature_fields != NULL) 
 require (cost <= ThresholdCost) 
 require (stake <= ThresholdStake) 
 require ( msg.sender ∄ Miners) 
 Transaction.push[Features_values] => Standard Format 




deployment locations. We use Solidity v 0.6.2 implementation for smart contracts and geth v 1.9.0 for 
Ethereum.  
Table VIII: Node configurations for laboratory Implementation 
Name Machine OS RAM Processor 
Node 1 Desktop 18.04 4GB 2.2GHz 
Node 2 Laptop 18.04 16GB 2.81Ghz 
Node 3 Desktop 16.04 8GB 2.44GHz 
Node 4 Laptop 18.04 4GB 2.44GHz 
Node 5 Vmware 18.04 4GB 2.2GHz 
Node 6 Vmware 18.04 4GB 2.2GHz 
Node 7 Vmware 18.04 4GB 2.2GHz 
Node 8 Vmware 18.04 4GB 2.2GHz 
attacker Laptop 16.04 4GB 2.2GHz 
database desktop window 4GB I5@2.44 
 
 
Fig. 12. Location of blockchain nodes around the United States 
 
We run the features extraction scripts that use tcpdump v. 4.9.2., libpcap v. 1.9.0, tcptrace v.6.6.0, 
Wireshark v. 3.0.1, and Scapy v.2.4.0 on all authorized nodes.  For the proof of concept, we also run an 
anomaly-based IDS called Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA) [9] on one authorized node (node 2). The 
attacking node launches a DoS attack at node 2; the scripts extract the features and submits them to the 
blockchain network. The transaction is verified, validated,  stored, and distributed among other nodes. 
We perform other frequently encountered attacks such as port scanning and Land attacks on node 2 to 
extract the features.  We record the transaction dissemination latency of each node for every transaction 
and calculate the average latency. Table IX shows the feature values for each attack. We implement 
moderate network traffic in the lab where every node has similar network traffic; however, the cloud 
experiment features diverse network traffic for each node. We evaluate the architecture’s performance 
using dissemination latency and scalability metrics.  
Table IX: Extracted Features for DoS, Port scanning and Land Attacks 
S/N FEATURES DoS Port Scanning Land 
1 No of connections 6594 8 11 
2 Source bytes(kbytes) 1147008 708 846 
3 Source frames 6592 10 9 
4 Source throughput(kbps) 1698.4 216.1 917.96 
5 Source frame/second 9995.4 3125.0 9999.99 
6 Destination bytes(kbytes) 355968 364 0 
7 Destination frames 6592 6 0 
8 Destination throughput(kbps) 527.1 111.08 0 
9 Destination frame/second 9995.4 1875.0 0 
10 Duration(seconds) 0.65 0.0032 0.009 
11 Source diff. host rate 0% 16% 11% 
12 Source same host rate 100% 84% 89% 
13 Source diff. service rate 99% 100% 11% 
14 Source same service rate 1% 0 89% 
15 Source diff. host count 1 1 1 
16 Source count 6583 6 1 
17 Destination diff. host count 1 1 1 
18 Destination service count 1 3 1 
19 Source IP 192.168.0.144 192.168.0.144 192.168.0.161 
20 Source port 8131 48314 80 
21 Destination IP 192.168.0.161 192.168.0.161 192.168.0.161 
22 Destination port 21 22 80 
23 Protocol TCP TCP TCP 
24 Type of service 0 0 0 
25 Time to live 64 64 64 
26 TCP flags SYN SYN SYN 
27 IP flags RES DF RES 
28 Urgent 0 0 0 
29 Fragment 0 0 0 
30 Land 0 0 1 
31 Checksum Correct Correct Correct 
32 Wrong fragment 0 0 0 
 
6.3.1 Performance Metrics 
6.3.1.1 Response Time 
We measure the response time of the architecture in two different scenarios: (i)Closed proximity, i.e., 
when we set up the experiment in the lab, and (ii) Wide geographical area, i.e., when deploying the 
experiment to the cloud platform. In the initial evaluation, we limit the cloud experiment to regions around 
the United States, thus deployed it to seven available regions. Figure 13 shows the average response time 
of all nodes for both laboratory and cloud deployments. We could observe that the average response time 
difference is not significant for both cases, contrary to expected. The reason for slightly low latency in the 
cloud deployment might be that the cloud nodes are connected with high-bandwidth, low latency dedicated 
optic fibers that provide high throughput between them. In addition to this, the cloud nodes' computing 
power might contribute to a slight reduction in the latency as compared to the lab nodes. Based on the 
result, we can conclude that the architecture can facilitate scalable attack features or signature exchange 
among  IDS nodes irrespective of the node’s location. 
 
Fig. 13. A) Average response time when performed in the lab. B) Average response time when deployed 
to locations around the US. 
6.3.1.2 Scalability  
We evaluate the change in the latency of the architecture with an increasing number of nodes. We first 
implement increasing the number of unauthorized (public) nodes on authorized nodes' response time. We 
randomly choose two nodes that are in South Carolina and Los Angeles and make them authorized nodes. 
The blockchain network is step up as described above with these authorized nodes, and an attack node 
launches a DoS attack. The features extracted from DoS attacks are prepared as transactions and submitted 
to the blockchain network. These transactions are verified, validated, stored, and distributed among the 
blockchain nodes. We record the deployment and execution times of each transaction for the two 
authorized nodes.  We increase the number of public nodes joining the network one at a time, repeat the 
experiment, and evaluate the two authorized nodes' response times. Figure 14 shows the response time of 
the two authorized nodes for an increasing number of public nodes. We observed that increasing the 
number of public nodes has no significant effect on the architecture's response time, which implies that 
the solution is robust to public IDS nodes joining or leaving the network. 
 
Fig.14.  The response time with an increasing number of public nodes 
 
Furthermore, we evaluate the response time with an increasing number of authorized nodes (i.e., 
miners). We set up a blockchain network in the lab, as we described above. We repeat the experiment 
and records the deployment and execution times of each transaction for all the nodes. We repeat the 
experiment several times, and the average response time of each node is recorded. We started with 
two miners and increased the number of miners one at a time. We repeat the experiment and record 
the average response times of each node. We repeated the experiment when we deployed it to the 
cloud platform and compared the results.  Figure 15 shows the response time of the nodes as the 
number of miners increases for both deployments. We observe a slight fall in the response time as 
more authorized nodes are added to the network. The decrease in latency might be due to more miners' 
availability to compete in the validation process, reducing the mining time (which accounts for an 
integral portion of the latency). The result further confirms that the architecture can facilitate scalable 
and prompt attack features exchange among  IDS nodes.  
 
 
Fig. 15. A) Response time of nodes with an increasing number of authorized nodes for closed proximity 






ARCHITECTURE’S SECURITY ANALYSIS 
7.1 Security Analysis 
The chapter describes the methods used in the proposed architecture to detect malicious activities from 
compromised authorized (insider threats) and untrusted public (external threat) nodes. In a private 
blockchain, the architecture is built to keep public nodes from interacting with the blockchain; hence they 
do not bother about detecting external threats. On the other hand, public blockchain incorporates every 
node; thus, it is challenging to isolate malicious nodes. Since the proposed architecture incorporate both 
private and public nodes, it is crucial to ensure that it can detect malicious activities from both internal 
and external threat actors. Figure 16 shows the authentication and verification processes to secure the 
network, especially from compromised authorized nodes. This chapter focuses on a detailed explanation 
of the transaction verification stage, as validation and distributed ledger stages have been described in the 
previous chapters. The verification is divided into node authentication and transaction verification. 
 
   
Fig. 16. Authentication and Verification blocks 
 
7.1.1 Node Authentication 
The smart contract authenticates every node that submits a transaction. In the blockchain network, nodes 
sign transactions using asymmetric cryptography: only the private key owner can create and sign her 
transactions. The person that signs a particular transaction can be verified using the corresponding public 
key. A public key acts as an address that belongs to the owner; it can be freely propagated in the blockchain 
network. However, the public key is just a bitstring and does not typically reveal the actual owner's true 
identity. In this work, the public keys of all authorized nodes are listed in the smart contract, and when a 
node submits a signed transaction, the smart contract executes the code that verifies the sender’s private 
key. We also implement a type of policy that evaluates transaction access control management in a 
consortium blockchain network. Authenticating a node requires that the smart contract retrieves the node 
information (transaction tag) and invokes a code that compares it with authorized nodes' listed information.  
The pseudocode below describes the snippet of the smart contract that handles the node’s authentication. 
If a node is successfully authenticated, the algorithm invokes the transaction verification code; else, the 
transaction is dropped. 
 
                                     
7.1.2 Transaction Verification 
The smart contract acts as a firewall that continuously monitors the ingress traffic (transaction submission) 
to the blockchain network. The smart contract handles the transaction verification before building it to a 
block. The transaction verification step ensures that all malicious transactions or activities on the submitted 
transaction, especially from insider nodes, are identified and thwarted. (i.e., it detects malicious activities 
Algorithm 5: Node Authentication 
Require: 
 Mapping (pubkey=>bytes32) public Keys 
 Mapping (account => bytes32) public Account; 
  
 procedure: ReadTransactionTag (Data, account, pubkey) 
  Data.owner ←msg.sender 
  Data.account ← account 
  Data.pubkey ← pubkey 
  Return TRUE 
 end procedure 
  
procedure: NodeAuthentication (pubkey, account) 
 require (pubkey ∈ Keys) 
 require (account ∈ Account) 
Owner.pubkey verifies owner.privkey 




from a compromised authorized node). The verification step also ensures that any submitted transaction's 
integrity and consistency are verified before attaching it to the blockchain network. This characteristic is 
primarily applicable in the architecture’s application in the Healthcare industry. To set up the smart 
contract, we defined a maximum gas limit for mining a transaction since transactions are submitted in a 
specific format; thus, gas prices almost identical. Any transaction gas prices higher than the threshold is 
flagged and results in failed transactions. To thwart the malicious behavior of transaction owners, we 
defined a function that keeps track of the miners. Here, we define a policy that invokes and drops 
transactions when transaction owners attempt to mine their transactions. We also set the maximum stake 
a miner can place on any transaction to encourage fair competition among the miners. The smart contract 
checks each submitted transaction's gas price and keeps track of all nodes participating in mining the 
transaction. 
Furthermore, we defined the format for submitted signatures and features and set a rule limiting the 
maximum number of transactions per second from a node. For each authorized node, we generate the key 
pairs using Digital Signature Algorithm ( DSA) with 1024 bit-length using the command ssh-keygen -t 
dsa -b 1024, copied the public key, and write it in the smart contract. Every authorized node signs its 
transaction with the private key, and a smart contract code verifies it using their public keys when the 
transaction is submitted to the blockchain. We also defined a retrieval policy that restricts the retrieval of 
transactions to specific nodes. Here, each transaction is given a unique retrieval tag in addition to the 
accompanying owner’s details. This tag contains the information of the nodes that are privileged to retrieve 
the transaction. We defined a privileged list and stores the retrieval tag information. The purpose is to 
create access control and management for transaction retrieval in the blockchain network. A snippet from 
the smart contract shows algorithm 6 pseudocode describing the transaction verification process. The 
upper part of the algorithm is invoked for the submitted transaction, while the lower part is invoked for 
transaction retrieval.  
For transaction verification to be successful, the transaction must agree with the defined format, and the 
owner must not mine its transaction. Also,  the gas price for mining transactions must not exceed the 
threshold, and the number of transactions per second must not exceed the maximum. If any of these 
conditions fail, the transaction is dropped, and other nodes are alerted about the node's malicious behavior. 
The lower part of algorithm 6 describes the condition for a transaction to be retrieved. A transaction owner 
who needs to restrict its transaction retrieval to specific nodes publishes the privileged nodes' information 
to the retrieval tag that accompanies the transaction. This information is added to the privilege list. To 
retrieve a transaction, the requester submits its information to the blockchain network. The smart contract 




7.2.1 Detection Analysis 
7.2.1.1 Outsider Threat Analysis 
Algorithm 6: Transaction Verification 
Require: 
 Mapping(transaction => struct) public Transaction; 
 Mapping (transaction_format => struct) public Format 
 Mapping (miners => struct) Miners 
Mapping (retrieval_tag => struct) public Tag 
  
 procedure: ReadTransaction (format,price,miner,owner,requester ) 
  Transaction.field ← format 
  Transaction.gas ←gas_price 
  Transaction.owner ← owner 
  Transaction.tag ← tag 
  Transaction.number ← count 
  Transaction.requester ← [] 
  return TRUE 
 end procedure 
 
// This is invoked for a submitted transaction 
procedure: TransactionVerification (Transaction) 
 require (format != NULL) 
 require (gas_price <= ThresholdGas) 
 require ( owner ∄ miners) 
 required (Count <= ThresholdCount) 
 return Succeful verification with timestamp 
end procedure 
 
// This is invoked for a retrieved transaction 
 procedure: RetrieveTransaction (Transaction) 
require (msg.sender ∈ Transaction.requester) 
require (sender.address ∈ Tag[address]) 
address ← Transaction.address 
Transaction.requester += msg.sender 
Allow Access to Block Information 
 end procedure 
 
We evaluated the architecture’s detection ability on unauthorized node transactions. A public or 
unauthorized node joins the blockchain network to retrieve the stored attack features or signatures. 
Although public nodes are part of the blockchain network, they are not privileged to participate in 
transaction chaining processes; hence, any attempt to get involved is considered malicious. Such 
transactions are discarded because they cannot be trusted. To prepare the transaction, we run the features 
extraction scripts on the public node. The node submits the extracted features to the blockchain network 
for verification and validation. Other authorized node starts mining to minimize the dissemination latency. 
Although other authorized nodes work to mine this transaction, we observed that a failed transaction 
notification is sent to the owner instead of the transaction block address. We investigated the result by 
checking the number of transactions in our blockchain network before and after the public node submits 
its transaction. It was observed that the number did not increase, indicating that the new transaction was 
not validated. We investigated further by manually generating the transaction address and then use it to 
query the Blockchain. The blockchain network did not return any transaction because there is no block 
with such an address in the network. The transaction failed because the owner failed the node 
authentication step. Based on the evaluation, we can say that the architecture allows only trusted nodes to 
submit transactions to the blockchain network. 
7.2.1.2 Insider Threat Analysis 
The insider nodes are authorized blockchain nodes that are privileged to participate in transaction 
validation processes. These nodes are authorized to submit, mine, and build transactions to blocks. When 
compromised, they can cause devastating effects on the shared information since they possess a write-
access to the blockchain ledger. Here, we describe the implementation of some common insider behavioral 
attacks and how our architecture detects them based on the nodes’ behavior.   The implemented insider 
attacks are divided into three categories (a)those attacks targeting the Blockchain to bring it down (such 
as DoS), (b) the attacks that attempt to inject fake data into the database, (c) the attacks that attempt to 
hijack or retrieve unauthorized transaction. 
7.2.1.2.1 Denial of Service Attacks 
7.2.1.2.1.1 A large volume of data 
We implement a case where a compromised node sends a large amount of what appears to be legitimate 
standard formatted transactions to mount a DoS attack on the blockchain network. This attack aims to 
exhaust the gas price so that a legitimate transaction will be denied validation. Authorized node prepares 
transactions that are a massive amount of data and submit to the blockchain network. Although other nodes 
are working to validate the transaction, we observed that the transactions are not mined. Notification to 
the owner indicates that the transaction failed due to its cost. We investigated further by manually 
generating the transaction address and then use it to query the Blockchain. The blockchain network did 
not return any transaction because no block with that transaction address resides in the network. When we 
check the transaction's metadata, we observed that the transaction's mining cost is greater than the gas 
price threshold, hence the failed notification. 
7.2.1.2.1.2 Multiple Submitted Transaction 
Here, a compromised blockchain node sends multiple copies of what appears to be a legitimate standard 
formatted request to mount a DoS attack on the blockchain network. The attack aims at exhausting the 
smart contract authentication and verification processes so that unverified transactions can be added to be 
blockchain. The node persistently submits a similar transaction to exhaust computing resources.  Although 
other nodes attempt to start the transaction's validation process, we observed that the transactions are not 
attached to the blockchain because the frequency of receiving similar transactions from the same node 
exceeds the smart contract threshold. We continue to submit the same request from the same authorized 
node, and we observed that the miners stop mining after the sender was flagged to be compromised. The 
smart contract stops processing subsequent transactions from the same authorized node. 
7.2.1.2.2 Blockchain data Injection attempt 
7.2.1.2.2.1 Fake transaction values 
A compromised node submits what appears to be legitimate standard formatted attack features but with 
fake data values. Each submitted transaction's gas price is below the threshold, and the frequency of 
submission is less than the threshold. Generally, it is assumed that an attacker will not hold an authorized 
node in a compromised state for too long due to network administrators' frequent security checks. Based 
on this assumption, an attacker will make all efforts to get its transactions validated to the Blockchain as 
quickly as possible. The transaction owner submits and mines its transaction to get it validated as fast as 
possible. The result showed that the transaction is not attached to the blockchain network, although other 
authorized nodes are also mining to validate the same transaction. The smart contract drops the transaction 
because the owner attempts to mine its transaction, making the activity flagged as malicious. The 
transaction failed because the owner attempts to mine its transaction, which is classified as malicious 
behavior.  
7.2.1.2.3 Unauthorized Transaction Retrieval Attempt 
7.2.1.2.3.1 Transaction Access Control 
Here, a public node attempts to retrieve an unauthorized transaction. We prepared a transaction that the 
retrieval is restricted to the authorized nodes only. This transaction was submitted and mined to the 
blockchain network. A public node retrieved the block address and queried the blockchain for the content 
of a newly added block.  The result showed that no information was returned because the node is not 
privileged to retrieve the data. The smart contract invokes the code that compares the information of the 
requesting public node to what is listed in the privileged list. Based on this, the smart contract controls 
access to that transaction. Access to the newly added block content is denied because the requesting node 
is not part of the authorized node. We investigate further by querying the Blockchain using another 
authorized node. We observed that the node successfully downloads the block's content from the 
Blockchain. 
7.2.1.2.3.2 Hijacking validating transaction 
Here, a malicious node attempts to copy the information of a block during the validation period. We 
develop and run a script on the malicious node that can replicate information. This attack aims to hijack 
the block's content the node is working on before validation is complete. We observed that instead of 
returning the validating block's content, the script returns the block's hash. The block's content was 
invisible to the miner because it has been sealed with a lock (hash) by the blockchain protocol. Based on 
these results, we can conclude that the architecture can provide a server-side authentication and 
verification process to detect and prevent malicious activities on the stored attack information. 
7.2.2. Performance Analysis 
7.2.2.1 Detection Time 
We evaluated the detection time for all attacks perform on the blockchain network. The detection time is 
defined as the time it takes for the architecture to notify a transaction's failure. This time is measured from 
when the transaction is submitted to the time the failure notification is received. Both the submission and 
notification times are timestamped and recorded for each attack.  Fig.17 shows the difference in the 
detection time for all attacks implemented. We observed that the time taken to detect a DoS attack with 
multiple transactions is the highest. The result could be because the algorithm waits to count the number 
of transactions per sec from the same sender before sending a notification.  
 
Fig. 17 The attack detection time 
We described the proposed architecture attributes and compared them with other approaches highlighted 
in the related work (Table X). The table shows the distinction between our proposed approach and other 
methods used for cooperative intrusion detection systems.  















Data Sharing ✓  ✓  x ✓  x ✓  ✓  
Blockchain ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  x ✓  
Detect External threats x ✓  ✓  ✓  x ✓  ✓  
Detect Insider Threats ✓  x x x x x ✓  
Compatible with different 
IDS 
x ✓  ✓  x x ✓  ✓  
Transaction verification x x x x x x ✓  
Useful for both Signature 
and Anomaly attack 
features  



















APPLICATION IN HEALTHCARE SYSTEMS 
8.1 Introduction 
Healthcare industries are proposing interoperability among different healthcare providers to strengthen 
healthcare delivery. The interoperability is important because a patient's diagnosis and treatment journey 
can take them from a physician's office to an imaging center or the hospital's operating room. Each stop 
generates a record, such as doctor's notes, test results, medical device data, discharge summaries, or 
information essential to the social determinants of health, which become part of a patient's electronic 
health record in each setting[68]. For the best outcome, this health information should be accessible and 
securely exchanged among all sources that accompany the patient's treatment every step of the way. This 
interoperability will strengthen care coordination and improve safety, quality, efficiency, and 
encouragement of robust health registries[69]. Since interoperability requires that shared patient 
information is of high integrity, confidential and consistent, healthcare systems need a tamperproof 
method of exchanging health records. Research methods proposed encryption and a centralized database 
to share patient health records securely [21, 57]. Although these solutions look promising and 
straightforward, some of the major problems threatening them are summarized below.     
8.2 Problem Statements 
The significant problems facing the available solution are  
• Encryptions only ensure the confidentiality of the data. It does not guarantee integrity and 
consistency. 
• The medium of exchange can be hacked, thereby compromising the integrity and consistency 
of the shared data.  
• The database housing the Electronic Health Records (EHRs) makes the data susceptible to 
single-point-of-failure or man-in-the-middle attacks.  
• The lack of a universal format for EHRs exchange makes it difficult to detect and prevent 
malicious activities. 
Several research studies have proposed blockchain applications for securing and sharing personal health 
data [55-60]. Despite the vast number of blockchain applications in healthcare, little attention has been 
focused on inter-healthcare health record exchange, this application’s motivation. This chapter describes 
the application of the proposed architecture to secure EHRs exchange across different healthcare systems. 
The healthcare application, an extension to the proposed architecture,  uses the architecture concept to 
exchange patients' health history between different healthcare systems. A healthcare system builds and 
maintains patient health information on an individual private blockchain platform that works on the same 
principle described for our proposed architecture. This application focuses on the interaction of blockchain 
networks to exchange patients’ EHRs across different healthcare providers. The application describes a 
novel method of data sharing between different blockchain networks using deployed smart contracts. 
Figure 18 shows the pictorial representation of the proposed solution. 
  
Fig. 18 The pictorial representation of the e-health application 
8.3 Methodology 
The work describes the inter-healthcare request and reply formation, verification, and validation. The 
building block is divided into three prominent stages, as shown in Figure 19. 
 
Fig. 19 The Building blocks of the e-health application 
8.3.1 Request 
The request stage is subdivided into three categories: request formation, client-side verification, and 
request validation. In this context, we define a transaction as any of the following: 
• A patient's health information about to be stored in the blockchain network 
• A request sent to another healthcare systems for  patients' medical history  
• A reply that carries the requested patient's information 
The request is formed to obtain patients’ medical history from another healthcare system or medical test 
results from another laboratory. For example, a student who lives, say in New York, the USA travels to 
say London, UK. If the student had to visit a hospital for treatment in the visiting country, the medical 
history should be retrieved from the home hospital for best medical care. In this case, we assume that all 
healthcare systems run private blockchain networks to store patient’s medical information securely. A 
patient's medical history can be retrieved by preparing a request with a piece of information unique to the 
patient. During the process, a requester (doctor or nurse in the visiting hospital) fills the required 
information into a developed script running on the nodes/workstations. This script captures the patients' 
necessary information such as name, date of birth, social security (SSN), name of the home hospital, and 
requester's unique code. Here, the doctor/nurse's workstation is part of that hospital’s blockchain nodes.   
Through the script, the node performs a client-side verification of the information and the requester’s 
network.  
The request is developed into an agreed-upon formatted transaction, digitally signed by the node, and 
submitted to the hospital's private blockchain network. Apart from the submitted transaction, the node 
submits a transaction tag that contains the sending node’s information and the requester's unique code. 
The smart contract that runs on the blockchain verifies the transaction's format and authenticates the node 
using the transaction tag. The purpose is to ensure that the transaction originates from privileged nodes 
and authorized personnel. Algorithm 7 pseudocode shows the snippet of the smart contract that handles 
the verification process. Since the healthcare blockchains communicate via smart contracts, each smart 
contract running on the blockchain networks contains the processes described in algorithm 7.  
The smart contract verifies the transaction and counts the number of requests from the same node within 
a certain period. We set a policy that restricts the processing of more than a transaction from the same 
node in a period. The code also confirms the destination healthcare in the lookup table and verifies the 
origin of the submitted transaction using the node’s digital signature. It checks the requester and node’s 
privilege of submitting transactions by comparing their information to the authorized list. Furthermore, 
the smart contract ensures transaction retrieval access control to patients' information requester. For a 
request to be successful, it must agree with the format, and the number of requests within a certain period 
must not exceed the threshold. Also, the requester must be authorized, the destination healthcare 
blockchain information must be available in the lookup table, and requesting node must be privileged. If 
any of these verification steps fail, the transaction is dropped. A successful request is validated and 
attached to the blockchain, as explained in the previous chapters.  
 
8.3.2  Reply 
After a successful validation process, the smart contract routes the request to the designated healthcare 
blockchain based on the name to address mapping on the lookup table.  The destination smart contract 
Algorithm 7: Request Verification 
  
 procedure: ReadRequest (Transaction, Tag ) 
  Transaction.field ← field 
  Transaction.number ← count 
  Tag.pubkeys ← pubkey 
  Transaction.owner ← owner 
  Tag.codes ← identifier 
  Tag.networkAddrs ← destdddr 
  Tag.accounts ← account 
  Transaction.data ← requestinfo 
  return TRUE 
 end procedure 
 
// This is invoked for a submitted request 
procedure: RequestVerification (Request) 
 require (field != NULL) 
 require (count <= Threshold) 
require (pubkey ∈ Public_keys) 
require ( code ∈ Identifiers) 
require (destaddr ∈ Networks) 
require (account ∈ Account) 
require(pubkey verifies priv_key) 
 return Successful verification with timestamp 
end procedure 
 
// This is invoked to authenticate the imcoming reply 
 procedure: ReadReply (Reply ) 
  Reply.addr ← srcaddr 
  Reply.data← info 
  Reply.network ← networkinfo 
  return TRUE 
 end procedure 
 
 procedure: ReplyAuthentication (Reply) 
  require(srcaddr == destaddr) 
  require (info == requestinfo) 
  require(networkinfo ∈ Networks) 
  Validate and allow access to Requesting node 
 end procedure 
   
verifies the format of the incoming request and the requesting blockchain. Algorithm 8 shows a 
pseudocode that describes the verification of an incoming request. The source information, request format, 
and digital signature of the source blockchain are verified. The supplied and requested information about 
the patient are confirmed. For an incoming request to be successful, the request's format must agree with 
the standard, source information must pass the verification step, requested patient’s information must be 
available in the destination healthcare network, and the source public key must verify its private key. If 
any verification steps fail, the request is dropped, and a failed request is sent to the source network. A 
successful request is validated and attached to the blockchain. Based on the required information, a reply 
is prepared and submitted for verification. The transaction is verified, as explained in previous chapters. 




The source network verifies the incoming reply. The smart contract verifies the incoming reply, the 
address of the reply’s network, and its digital signature, as shown in the lower part of algorithm 7. If the 
verification process is successful, the transaction (reply) is validated and attached to the blockchain. The 
blockchain is updated, and the newly added block reflects on the ledger of every node in the network. All 
blockchain nodes receive the newly added block notification but do not have access to the block's content. 
Algorithm 8: Reply Formation 
  
 procedure: ReadIncomingRequest (Request ) 
  Request.field ← field 
  Request.number ← count 
  Request.description ← information 
  Request.owner ← Patient_information 
  Tag.address ← address 
  Tag.account ← account 
  return TRUE 
 end procedure 
 
// This is invoked for an incoming request 
procedure: IncomingRequestVerification (Incoming Request) 
 require (field != NULL) 
 require (count <= Threshold) 
require (information ∈ blockchain metadata) 
require (address ∈ Networks) 
require (account ∈ Account) 
require(pubkey verifies priv_key) 
 return Successful verification with timestamp 
end procedure 
 
// This is invoked for a reply formation, verification and validation 
procedure: ReplyFormation (Reply) 
 require (field != NULL) 
require (pubkey ∈ Public_keys) 
require (address ∈ Networks) 
require (account ∈ Accounts) 
require (data == patient_information)  





The requesting node retrieves the information in the block, and a developed script converts it to a format 
that the requester (healthcare worker) can easily understand.  
8.4 RESULTS 
In this ongoing work, we set up the proposed application in the laboratory. We set up two different private 
blockchain networks (I and II), with each network comprises three nodes. For each blockchain network, 
we use Solidity v 0.6.2 implementation for smart contracts and geth v 1.9.0 for Ethereum. The smart 
contract is written as described above and mined into the blockchain network. A transaction (request) was 
prepared as explained and submitted to the transaction in blockchain network I. We randomly generate 
ten-string long numbers to serve as the unique requester code. The miner information, the request format 
and reply, and the requester's unique codes are written in the smart contract. Apart from this, information 
about blockchain II is written in the smart contract. This smart contract is mined to the blockchain  I 
network. We developed a similar smart contract (with the blockchain I information) and mined it into 
blockchain II's network.  
We evaluate a preliminary result on the security analysis of the proposed system. We anticipated and 
tested ways a compromised node could access unauthorized patient information within a healthcare 
blockchain network. We performed the attack and presented the result obtained from our architecture. We 
showed how the architecture detects a compromised node. We compare the proposed system's attributes 
with other similar works from the literature, and we present the result in table XI. 
8.4.1 Security Analysis 
8.4.1.1 Multiple Submitted Requests 
Here, a compromised blockchain node sends multiple copies of what appears to be a legitimate standard 
formatted request to mount a DoS attack on the blockchain network. The node persistently submits a 
similar request transaction to exhaust computing resources.  Although other nodes attempt to start the 
transaction's validation process, we observed that the transactions are not attached to the blockchain 
because the frequency of receiving similar transactions from the same node exceeds the threshold. We 
continue to submit the same request from the same authorized node, and we observed that the miners stop 
mining after the sender was flagged to be compromised. The smart contract stops processing subsequent 
transactions from the same authorized node. 
8.4.1.2 Unauthorized retrieval of patient's record 
Here, a node attempts to retrieve an unauthorized transaction. The node queries the Blockchain for the 
content of a newly added block in which it is not the requester.  The result showed that no information 
was returned because the node is not privy to retrieve the data. In the smart contract, we define a policy 
that limits information retrieval to the node that submitted the request. Based on this policy, the smart 
contract controls access to that transaction block. We investigate further by querying the Blockchain using 
the requester. We observed that the node successfully downloads the block's content from the Blockchain. 

















Blockchain-based ✓  ✓  x ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  
Access Control ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  
Privacy 
Preservation 
✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  
Inter-healthcare 
PHI exchange 
x x x x ✓  x x ✓  
Information 
Verification 









This dissertation proposed an architecture that enhances the detection of coordinated or distributed 
cyberattacks to strengthen cooperative intrusion detection systems. The solution, a permissionless public-
private blockchain network, leverages blockchain network capabilities to secure cyberattack features and 
signatures and promptly share them among participating IDS nodes in real-time. It is a public blockchain 
because it allows a permissionless joining and leaving of nodes, whereas it is considered a private 
blockchain because only specific nodes are allowed to participate in the transaction validation processes. 
The solution’s novelties include; a) detecting and preventing malicious activities on cyberattack features 
and signatures from public nodes, b)  facilitating scalable and secured attack features and signature 
exchange among  IDS nodes in computer networks, c) continuously monitoring the activities of blockchain 
nodes to detect compromised insider nodes, d) providing strong server-side authentication and verification 
process for transaction owners and submitted transaction,  e) presenting a standard format for verified 
cyberattack features and signature which encourages heterogeneous participation of IDS nodes, f) storing 
the verified transaction in a tamper-proof, immutable, distributive ledger and g)  robustness to public nodes 
joining and leaving the network in real-time. 
We first implement the architecture in the laboratory, then deployed it to a google cloud platform.  We 
compared the results from the two implementations using some performance metrics such as transaction 
dissemination latency and scalability. We further carry out the security analysis. The security analysis 
investigates how the architecture detects some typical insider and outsider attacks directed towards 
contaminating the stored information. The result shows that the architecture can detect an attack within a 
short period of launching the attack and prevent malicious activities from insider and outsider threats on 
shared data. At the same time, the performance result shows that the architecture's latency is low.  
Furthermore, we describe the architecture’s application in the healthcare system. In the ongoing work, we 
describe how the application is suitable for exchanging patient’s health records across different healthcare 
systems. We evaluated the performance using security analysis and detection time metrics. The 
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